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1. Introduction
Carrying out a business valuation requires a task analysis because the enter-
prise value (firm value, company value) depends on the respective task  – in this 
context also known as purpose or function  – which the valuation should support. 
A company does not only have a specific value for each valuator or, generally, 
each valuation subject (i.e. the potential investor), but it can  – depending on 
the task  – also have quite a different value. Thus, business valuation is always 
purpose-dependent: It is vital to acknowledge that an “only true” company value 
and a solely appropriate method for its calculation do not exist. The principle of 
purpose dependency is the basis of the functional business valuation theory, which 
originated in Germany. In addition to the principle of purpose dependency, this 
theory relies on the principle of subjectivity, the principle of future-orientation, 
and the principle of total valuation (overall rating).
The functional business valuation theory differentiates between main and 
minor functions (Matschke, Brösel 2011, 2013, 2018 and 2021). The main func-
tions are related to interpersonal conflicts. Therefore, it is about those valuations 
that are aimed at a change of ownership of the (share of the) company to be 
valued or at the delimited business units to be assessed (Matschke 1979, p. 17). 
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Nevertheless, it does not matter whether the change of ownership is only con-
sidered or has actually occurred.
Among the occasions that entail a “change of ownership” are:
− occasions in which a ”change of ownership” really occurs (e.g. purchase/
sale);
− opportunities where there is “no change of ownership”, but the same owner-
ship (in form of an unchanged circle of shareholders/owners) results in an 
altered ownership structure with regard to the valuation object (e.g. merger/
demerger).
Business valuations in the context of minor functions are those that are not 
directed toward a change of ownership. Occasions are, for instance, valuations 
for accounting and taxation purposes, valuations for “value-based” management 
and control, and valuations in the context of credit analyses. Therefore, minor 
functions include but are not limited to the credit support function, the manage-
ment control function, and the standard / statute (law) reading function, the latter 
of which comprises both the information and the tax base assessment function 
(Brösel 2006).
On the other side, there are three main functions: the decision function, 
the arbitration function, and the argumentation function (cf. Figure 1, Matschke, 
Brösel 2011, p. 13; Matschke, Brösel 2013, p. 52; Matschke, Brösel 2018, p. 14).
The result of a business valuation within the decision function is called the 
decision value of the enterprise. The term “decision function’ considers the pur-
pose of valuation to lay the foundations of rational decision-making for a very 
specific valuation subject (decision maker, e.g. buyer, seller) in a highly particular 
decision and conflict situation (e.g. acquisition, divestiture). For a given target 
system and decision field, the decision value indicates the conditions under which 
the execution of a particularly scheduled action just does not diminish the level 
of goal achievement (use value or utility value) attainable without this very ac-
tion. It refers to all relevant conditions for the agreement between the conflicting 
parties (so-called conflict resolution relevant issues) and states which (combina-
tions of) characteristics of these issues can still be accepted in the event of an 
agreement. Therefore, the decision value, which must be considered as the base 
value or underlying value for all main functions, represents the concession limit 
of a party in a specific conflict situation, and should hence not become known 
to the opposite side.
The arbitration value, on the other hand, is the result of a business valuation 
in the context of the arbitration function (mediation) and is intended to facilitate 
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or bring about an agreement on the conditions of change of ownership of the 
valuation object (e.g. the company) between the buyer and the seller. It is a value 
proposed by an impartial (“neutral”) appraiser/valuator/evaluator, on the basis 
of which they, as mediators, consider a conflict resolution possible. The arbitra-
tion value should be regarded as a compromise that is deemed acceptable for 
the parties involved and that ultimately safeguards their interests appropriately. 
Therefore, it is necessary that the appraiser determines the respective supposed 
decision values of the conflicting parties up front.
Figure 1. Main functions of functional business valuation
Finally, the argumentation value is the result of a business valuation in the 
sense of the argumentation function. It is an instrument for influencing the ne-
gotiating partner in order to achieve the best possible conflict resolution for the 
arguer. The argumentation value is thus a partially biased value. More importantly, 
it cannot be reasonably determined without the knowledge of one’s own decision 
value and without assumptions about the counterparty’s decision value, because 
only the relevant decision values allow one party to state which negotiation re-
sults are consistent with a rational behavior and should be attained by means of 
a reasonable argumentation value.
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While the arbitration function (mediation) focuses on each conflicting party 
involved in the contemplation, both the decision and argumentation function are 
aimed at only one party to the conflict. While the results of the decision function 
represent confidential self-information (internal orientation in the negotiation 
process), the results of the argumentation function are information directed to 
the negotiating partner (external orientation in the negotiation process).
Since the argumentation function has so far been the least penetrated func-
tion within the body of research, this function will be dealt with in more detail 
below. First, a comprehensive definition is given. Second, an overview of the 
possible applications is presented. Then, conceivable internal and external us-
ages are showcased. After that, the characteristics of the argumentation value are 
systematized. Finally, the insights will be summarized.
2. Basics of the argumentation value  
and the argumentation function
2.1. Definition and substance/nature
The argumentation value is the result of a business valuation in the sense of 
the argumentation function (Matschke 1976; Matschke 1977a; Matschke 1977b; 
Matschke, Mucheyer 1977; Wagenhofer 1988a; Wagenhofer 1988b; Hafner 1993; 
Gorny 2002; Hering, Olbrich 2002; Barthel 2004; Brösel 2004; Brösel, Burchert 
2004; Hering, Brösel 2004; Barthel 2005; Matschke, Brösel 2008; Ol brich et al. 
2009; Matschke et al. 2010; Matschke, Brösel 2011, p. 279; Brö sel et al. 2012; 
Matschke, Brösel 2013, p. 607; Ol brich et al. 2015; Toll, He ring 2017; Fol lert et 
al. 2018; Matschke, Brösel 2018, p. 289; Rapp et al. 2018; Fol lert 2020; Matschke, 
Brösel 2021, p. 259). The argumentation value does not denote a single value 
size (Tichy 1994, p. 160), but rather the totality of justifications (arguments) 
which one negotiating party reveals or makes available with the aim of improving 
one’s own bargaining position or even weakening the position of the negotiat-
ing partner and, in turn, ultimately reaching a more favorable negotiation result 
(Barthel 2005, p. 36; Barthel 2010; Barthel 2011; Frey, Rapp 2011). They represent 
partisan values, the importance of which within the negotiation manifests itself 
in the crucial support of the own views and demands with the aim of influencing 
(Semann 1970) the opposite party (Barthel 2005, p. 33).
The aspect of striving for a change in the behavior of the negotiating party, 
or at least in their point of view, with the help of a business valuation is an 
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important reason why the argumentation function has been the least theoretically 
permeated or accepted main function of a business valuation to date (Eichmann 
1992, p. 48). The notion that there are “no general rules for the determination of 
argumentation values” (Mandl, Rabel 1997, p. 22) might be a little prematurely 
because a thorough analysis of the argumentation function has not taken place 
yet. This theoretical neglect is all the more astounding because of the task at hand, 
to render argumentation aid for and during negotiations, is likely to be practiced 
commonly. One might venture the assumption that all reports which are presented 
at the negotiating table by one party were simply made available because the 
respective party promises themselves additional support in their own bargain-
ing position (Barthel 1990, p. 1147; Barthel 2005, p. 32). Any and all disclosed 
reports are here understood in the sense of “argumentation values”. Therefore, it 
is neither recommendable nor useful to anyone to close the “eyes of science” to 
the complex of influencing the counterparty by partially biased information, and 
to ignore this area of the business valuation entirely. It is just the way it is that 
business valuations are used as argumentation aids  – this fact must be taken into 
consideration during negotiations in which business valuations play a key role.
2.2. Overview of possible applications
Usually, a series of arguments is deliberately introduced in the negotiation 
process, mostly in the form of supposed decision values or presented in the form 
of seemingly impartial arbitration values. If the negotiation is agreement-seeking, 
the change of ownership of the company should be realized on conditions that 
are as far as possible from one’s own concession limit and as close as possible to 
the suspected concession limit of the opposite party. However, the derivation of 
appropriate argumentation values requires not only the knowledge of one’s own 
decision value1 and an educated guess about the opposing decision value2, but 
also an idea about the desired negotiation result. If negotiators know their own 
decision values and also recognize them, argumentation values do not provide 
any “instruments of over-reaching” (Matschke 1976, p. 520).
An argumentation value is always partial which is not necessarily congruent 
with one-sided. Those who use argumentation values would like to gain benefits 
that they otherwise would not have reached it at all or at least not so quickly. 
Conversely, they would like to avoid or mitigate possible disadvantages. 
 1 The knowledge of one’s own decision value is particularly important within a constructive argu-
mentation strategy because it is aiming at a compromise on which both parties can easily agree to.
 2 If a non-dominated conflict situation is agreement-seeking, an area of agreement has to exist. Hence, 
the decision value of the buyer must be higher than the decision value of the seller.
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The negotiating position of a party can be strengthened in several ways:
− Arguments may be provided that allow the other negotiating party to make 
concessions or to agree to a specific negotiation outcome.
− The negotiating party may also receive information by which:
• arguments of the opposing side of the negotiation are invalidated,
• offers of negotiations are rejected for obvious reasons,
• offers of negotiations may be modified in a manner favorable to one’s own 
benefit.
Besides, in order to be able to influence the opposing party and thereby to 
alter the negotiation result, influencing the impartial expert (e.g. valuator) or the 
courts may also be advisable (Barthel 2010, p. 2236). The usage of argumentation 
values is not limited to the actual negotiation process with the counterparty, e.g. the 
buying and selling of a company, but can also be deployed in negotiation-tactical 
intention in the preliminary and subsequent negotiations be-tween internal conflicts 
parties (Coenenberg, Sieben 1976, p. 4076; Matschke 1977a, p. 91; Born 2003, 
p. 24). After the actual negotiation, it is conceivable that argumentation values 
are required, for instance, to justify a business acquisition or the termination of 
a negotiation process, respectively, to the supervisory bodies or the shareholders.
As far as the use in the run-up to the actual negotiation is concerned, this 
assumes one multi-level decision maker. Argumentation values can then serve to 
communicate and to gain better acceptance with higher level decision makers 
(such as the group management) or within a decision-making body (such as within 
the board of directors). Moreover, they might be useful to induce those high-level 
decision makers  – from the point of view of the arguer  – to the desired decision, 
such as commencing negotiations or acquiring a business.
In addition to this decision influencing, business valuations may also have 
the purpose of delimitation of responsibilities in in-house negotiation processes. 
On the one hand, it may be intended to distribute the responsibility for a poten-
tially wrong decision at an early stage on as many shoulders as possible, so that 
the own future bargaining position is affected as little as possible by a false deci-
sion that was backed or even initiated (sharing of responsibility). On the other 
hand, it could be that particularly those, who originally forced the acquisition of 
a property and after an acquisition also have to assume the line responsibility for 
this object of purchase, already took precautions for this eventuality during the 
advocating business valuation, so that their subsequent activity is not burdened 
from the outset with “a mortgage difficult to redeem” (passing on of responsibil-
ity). Figure 2 summarizes some application possibilities of argumentation values 
(Barthel 2005, p. 37; Matschke, Brösel 2011, p. 283; Matschke, Brösel 2011, p. 613; 
Matschke, Brösel 2018, p. 293; Matschke, Brösel 2021, p. 263).
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Figure 2. Utilization of argumentation values in business valuation
2.3. Internal usage of argumentation values
Now, let’s consider the aspect of the delimitation of responsibility which 
is related to one’s own party to the conflict and precedes the external conflict. 
Point of departure for an argumentative business valuation for the passing on of 
responsibility might be the valuation relevant success (economic benefit) of the 
company to be evaluated for the valuation subject. Success is here in the sense of 
(accounting) profit and for reasons of simplification it is assumed that the profit is 
fully and immediately available to the buyer company. Figure 3 (Matschke 1977a; 
Matschke, Brösel 2011, p. 284; Matschke, Brösel 2011, p. 614; Matschke, Brösel 
2018, p. 294; Matschke, Brösel 2021, p. 264) showcases three different repre-
sentations for the same issue, whereby each time the entire valuation-relevant 
profit contribution of the object of purchase from the point of view of the buy-
ing company (the valuation subject) is addressed, which was estimated to its full 
extent in a realistic manner and without any intention of manipulation. In the 
future, the object of purchase will continue to be legally independent from the 
buying company as a wholly owned subsidiary, but economically managed as an 
integral part of the newly expanded company.
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Figure 3. Allocation of the valuation-relevant profit contribution considering an internal 
demarcation of responsibilities
In representation A, the valuation-relevant profit contribution is reported as 
a total amount. In representation B, it is composed of two values. On the one 
hand, one amount is expected from the company in the case of independent 
continuation of the purchase object by the buyer company. On the other hand, 
there is a supposed increase of profits as a result of economies of scope (synergy 
effects) after the acquisition and integration of the object of purchase. Representa-
tion B corresponds to a usual allocation and procedure for the profit estimation 
for business valuations. The representations A and B are completely sufficient if 
it were only a question of determining the appropriate decision value from the 
point of view of the buyer company with an assumed profit objective. However, 
if the business valuation should also be used as an internal argumentation aid to 
delimitate later responsibilities, both representation A and representation B are 
not very expedient, because, for instance, representation B does not clearly show 
whether the supposed profit increase is to be expected in the object of purchase 
itself or in other areas of the buyer company.
As an argumentation aid to the demarcation of responsibility (in the sense of 
a transfer of responsibility) for a later profit realization, representation C is rather 
suitable. There, the entire valuation-relevant profit contribution is allocated to dif-
ferent corporate divisions in which it is created and reported. If those responsible 
Profit of the       




corporate divisions of 
the buying company 
after integration
Positive            
synergy effects




















Functional business valuation  – The theoretical foundation of argumentation value...
for the business valuation should also bear responsibility for that purchase object 
after the actual acquisition, their immediate responsibility is limited to the profit 
in the amount of the double-framed area. This profit could  – within an overall 
realistic estimate  – then be valued rather pessimistically by them, whereas the 
expected increase in profits in other divisions of the buyer company would likely 
be fairly optimistic. That way, the internal arguers could try to reach both their 
desired acquisition of the object of purchase and an extensive passing on of re-
sponsibility for later profit realizations.
2.4. External usage of argumentation values
However, it is not likely that the company-internal decision-influencing and 
also the internal delimitation of responsibilities are at the center of attention of 
the argumentative use of business valuations, but rather the negotiations with 
company externals (the counterparty) instead. In such negotiations, conditions 
are specified under which the intended change of ownership of the company to 
be valued should be executed. In the case of a purchase/sale, it is particularly 
the amount of the price payable that will be the subject of negotiation, whereas 
in the case of merger/demerger, the distribution of property rights (e.g. shares) 
will likely play the most prominent role between the parties.
A business valuation as an argumentation aid would be dispensable in such 
negotiations, for example, if the parties in a buying/selling constellation would 
float their respective purchase/selling offers unfoundedly and an agreement would 
ultimately come about on a mere sequence of price concessions on both sides. In 
such a case, it would be sufficient for a rational negotiation of the parties that they 
know and also follow their respective decision values. The buyer must know how 
much he can pay at the maximum, the seller how much he must at least claim. 
Figure 4 explains the negotiation situation just described, in which a company 
valuation is dispensable as an argumentation aid because the agreement results 
from a mere sequence of unfounded price offers. The continuous presentation 
was chosen for reasons of simplification (Matschke 1969, p. 60).
On the abscissa, the duration of the negotiation is plotted, whereas on the 
ordinate the result of the negotiation is displayed. The price claims of the seller 
become lower as negotiations last longer, while the price offers of the buyer will 
likely increase. After a certain time of negotiation, demand and offer will (hope-
fully) match. Both parties have agreed on a certain price. This price is acceptable 
from the point of view of both parties because it is both below the price ceiling of 
the buyer (Pmax) as well as above the bottom price (Pmin) of the seller. However, 
during the negotiation process the parties only know their respective decision limit.
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Figure 4. Negotiation as a mere sequence of price claims
The negotiation situation, which is depicted in Figure 4 in the manner of 
an “oriental bazaar”, seems to apply for “negotiations” about the price of a com-
pany rather only in exceptional cases, for instance, in M&A auctions. For conflict 
resolution processes when buying/selling a company, it is rather characteristic 
(Matschke 1977a, p. 95) that
− the parties justify their offers based on business valuation results;
− The agreement is less directly reached by direct price concessions rather than 
by a cooperative search (Barthel 2005, p. 34) for the “right” parameters of 
a business valuation in the context of a particular business valuation method, 
the application of which the conflicting parties have agreed upon;
− the concessions of the parties particularly refer to those valuation parameters.
In such negotiation situations, the own decision value for the respective party 
does not represent a sufficient basis for negotiations, because on the basis of the 
own decision value a party shouldn’t argue if they do not want their bargaining 
position weakened decisively. Therefore, the parties in reality have to cope with the 
problem how to justify their offers as convincingly and as less vulnerably as possible 
on the one hand, while simultaneously trying to impede or even prevent infer-
ences with regard to their own decision value based on the presented justification.
In order to solve this problem, the parties resort to argumentation values 
of the company. Thus, they might also be regarded as communication media 
(Kußmaul 1996, p. 267) in order to ultimately bridge the existing conflicts of in-
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At this point, it is even hypothesized that argumentation values are accepted by 
the conflicting parties as part of the laws of the game of a purchase negotiation 
and that they  – despite their apparent intention to influence  – do not constitute 
any instruments of overreaching as long as the parties know and honor their own 
decision value in the negotiation process.
As far as the intention to influence is concerned, the following differentia-
tion seems appropriate: there is an argument with regard to the distribution of 
benefits within the assumed agreement area and/or there is an argument with 
respect to influencing that assumed agreement area.
The argumentation values used in the first case are means to separate as 
much as possible from the suspected, realizable advantage in the amount of the 
difference between ceiling price and bottom price. For this purpose, for example, 
argumentation values, which lie in the vicinity of the presumed decision value of 
the counterparty, might be introduced in the negotiation in order to underpin 
corresponding price claims. It is part of a thorough negotiation preparation that 
the decision-making situation of the opposite side is analyzed, their interests are 
ideally fully recognized, and their concession limit(s) are estimated. Such argu-
mentation values have, for reasons of credibility and also for its usefulness as an 
instrument of influence, to be construed realistically and must not show up as 
“exorbitant prices”, because who thinks that one could impress the negotiation 
partner on the basis of unilateral arguments, which are translated into an obvi-
ously unrealistic value (Born 2003, p. 25), is likely to be severely misled.
But the intention to influence can also  – as the second case expresses  – be 
aimed at changing the area of agreement itself in a way that is beneficial for the 
own negotiation strategy, be it in a rather manipulative intent with regard to 
a shift of the area of agreement toward the suspected decision value of the counter 
side, or be it more in a cooperative intention to create an agreement area or 
to expand an already existing one and thereby enlarge the potential benefits for 
both parties in case of an agreement (Barthel 2005, p. 34).
The cooperative use of argumentation values is particularly significant. For 
example, it may appear that information about the argumentation value is com-
muned to the negotiating partner which is suitable to expand an existing agree-
ment area. But the information could also create the prerequisites for an agree-
ment by prompting the negotiating partner to a revision of its own decision value 
which proves favorable in terms of agreement-seeking endeavors. For instance, 
the seller could point the buyer to integration options, which the buyer has not 
yet perceived and which also would allow a rise of the maximum payable price 
so that a previously rather unacceptable price claim of the seller would become 
more acceptable (Semann 1970, p. 143).
In the context of considering the argumentation function of business valu-
ation, it is therefore not recommended to start from the assumption of the less 
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expedient picture of the negotiation as an “overreaching event”, but rather of 
the positively connoted image of the negotiation as a “cooperative benefit en-
hancement event”. With regard to the latter point of view, the joint creation and 
the aligned perception of additional benefits are occupying the center stage of 
negotiation efforts. In this way, the always given conflict of interest between the 
negotiating parties  – because of the distribution of benefits  – can be mitigated, 
less stressed and hence also bridged more likely. To negotiate creatively means 
to discover differences and to coordinate those in such a way that cooperation 
profits (benefits/gains) arise (Siebe 1996, p. 206). In this sense, argumentation 
values should be introduced in the negotiation process.
3. Characteristics of argumentation values
3.1. Overview
Hereinafter, the numerous properties of argumentation values are summarized 
and systematized. These are attributable to three main features, the feature of 
camouflage, the feature of party orientation, and the feature of conflict solution 
orientation. Figure 5 shows a possible systematization of the properties of the 
argumentation value based on Brösel (2004, p. 518).
Figure 5. Main characteristics of argumentation values
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3.2.  Feature of camouflage
Since argumentation values are not introduced in a negotiation in their 
proper form, but rather as supposed or ostensible decision or arbitration values, 
the characteristic of camouflage applies to them. True, it is part of the mimicry 
of the argumentation value that it denies its genuine character (Matschke 1977a, 
p. 102). Attention should be paid to the fact that depending on the justification 
of bids and offers, the drawing of conclusions about the decision value of the 
arguing party might be complicated or even hindered entirely.
3.3. Feature of party orientation  
and characteristics derived thereof
According to the feature of party orientation, argumentation values are values 
of one negotiation side, designed to a specific negotiating situation and thus to 
a concrete negotiating partner, and should invigorate the bargaining position in 
the negotiation process (Matschke 1977a, p. 91).
Consequences of this main property are the feature of relation to decision 
values and the feature of influencing. The latter states that with the help of the 
argumentation function of the business valuation a change in behavior of the ne-
gotiation partner is sought. That party should be induced by argumentation 
values to even consciously concede certain conflict resolution issues or desired 
negotiation results.
The feature of relatedness to decision values aims at two directions. On the 
one hand, one’s own decision value is the last line of retreat for the argumenta-
tion value (Coenenberg, Sieben 1976, col. 4076; Coenenberg 1992, p. 92). Hence, 
by presenting argumentation values in the negotiation neither the own decision 
value should be announced, nor should the opposite side be enabled to draw 
valuable conclusions about it. On the other hand, argumentation values should 
be directed toward the alleged decision value of the counterparty (Matschke 1976, 
p. 521; Gorny 2002, p. 156; Born 2003, p. 24).
3.4. Feature of conflict resolution orientation  
and characteristics derived thereof
The feature of conflict resolution orientation comes into play by the fact 
that argumentation values are usually introduced to the negotiation with the 
purpose to reach an agreement or non-agreement (Gorny 2002, p. 11; Ballwieser, 
Hachmeister 2016, p. 2) with regard to a change of ownership of the valuation 
object (i.e. the company).
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Since argumentation values are usually not equivalent to price quotations that 
are simply floated arbitrarily, but represent well-founded price notions instead, 
they serve to bridge the existing conflicts of interest between the negotiation 
partners, especially with regard to the price level or also other parameters, and 
finally to achieve a conflict resolution. This can be done by a cooperative search 
for conflict resolution relevant issues supported by argumentation values and 
a subsequent agreement on corresponding characteristics of these parameters 
(Matschke 1977a, p. 96). The conflict resolution orientation is reflected in the 
subordinate features of information, flexibility, and credibility.
The feature of information distinguishes the argumentation values because 
the negotiating parties try to justify their offers with these values (Matschke 1977a, 
p. 96). As a result, the negotiating partner gains information about the asking price 
of the other party and may also possibly infer the negotiating tactics chosen by 
that party. Furthermore, the negotiating partners might be able to gain previously 
unknown information about the valuation object from the use of both external 
and internal argumentation values  – in particular, if they are introduced into the 
process as arbitration values by “independent” appraisers/valuators (Matschke 
1976, p. 521). With the use of argumentation values  – like already presented  – 
information can also be deliberately “leaked” to the negotiating partner to ex-
pand the presumed range of agreement, i.e. the difference between one’s own 
decision value and the alleged decision value of the counterparty, particularly by 
an intended correction of the decision value of the other party to the conflict 
(Matschke 1977a, p. 98). This shows the close connection of the feature of infor-
mation with the characteristic of influencing.
On the one hand, the feature of flexibility describes the ability of argumen-
tation values to take into account newly obtained information and intermediate 
results of the negotiation (Sieben 1993, p. 4319). On the other hand, within the 
context of the argumentation function the applied valuation methods should be 
both easy to manage and be customizable because these methods allow several 
starting points for an argument, especially in order to not appear untrustworthy 
to the negotiating partner. This emphasizes the close link to the feature of 
credibility discussed below (Coenenberg, Sieben 1976, col. 4076; Coenenberg 
1992, p. 92).
Eventually, an argumentation value only proves to be useful if the feature of 
credibility applies (Coenenberg, Sieben 1976, col. 4076; Coenenberg 1992, p. 92; 
Sieben 1993, p. 4319; Barthel 2004, p. 409; Barthel 2006; Barthel 2009, p. 1030; 
Knackstedt 2019, p. 224). Hence, argumentation values should represent con-
vincing, less vulnerable, “realistic” values, the determination of which is tolerated 
and will ultimately be accepted as a substantiated offer (Matschke 1977a, p. 97). 
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With regard to the renown of the profession of certified public accountants (ex-
ternal auditors), their prepared valuation reports are quite suited as long as the 
negotiating partner doesn’t realize their limited usability for decision purposes. 
Thus, the valuation reports of auditors are used as argumentation values if it is 
beneficial for the conflicting parties, because basically it can be assumed that 
the facts and figures of the report have not been put together with the intent to 
deceive or even to defraud (Matschke 1976, p. 521).
4. Conclusions
Both the argumentation function and argumentation values are considerably 
versatile. Although both have still not received a sufficiently broad theoretical 
acceptance in research, the argumentation function is most likely to be the by 
far most utilized function in the practice of business valuation so that calculated 
or otherwise determined enterprise values have typically to be classified as argu-
mentation values. Nonetheless, the present article could successfully demonstrate 
that both the argumentation function and argumentation values are theoretically 
well-founded.
On the one hand, argumentation values are used in negotiations with a con-
flicting party in which an agreement on the transaction of a company is sought. 
Argumentation values should primarily be employed to influence the negotiation 
result, but they can influence the negotiation process, too.
On the other hand, argumentation values can also be introduced within 
a company. This can be done before the actual negotiation starts in order to en-
sure a desired decision of the superiors, e.g. management, or to achieve an early 
limitation and distribution of the responsibilities. Furthermore, its application 
is conceivable after the negotiation is concluded in order to better justify the 
transaction in retrospect.
Argumentation values must fulfill the feature of camouflage, the feature of 
party-relatedness, and the feature of conflict resolution orientation in order to 
be usable in the sense of the argumentation function. Note that the characteris-
tic of camouflage is the essential component because argumentation values are 
disclosed, but regularly stated as decision values.
In practice, the concrete determination of the argumentation value both 
in Germany and in the USA might chiefly take place by means of applying DCF 
methods, in particular the WACC approach including the CAPM to calculate the 
cost of equity. By utilizing these popular “objectifying” methods, parties to the 
conflict can press their point of view particularly well in negotiations, as long as 
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they are capable of using and of interpreting both the techniques and the calcu-
lated results to their own advantage.
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